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Data from all reported cases of 2009 pandemic inﬂuenza A (H1N1) were obtained from the China Information
System for Disease Control and Prevention. The spatiotemporal distribution patterns of cases were characterized
through spatial analysis. The impact of travel-related risk factors on invasion of the disease was analyzed using
survival analysis, and climatic factors related to local transmission were identiﬁed using multilevel Poisson re-
gression, both at the county level. The results showed that the epidemic spanned a large geographic area, with the
most affected areas being in western China. Signiﬁcant differences in incidence were found among age groups,
with incidences peaking in school-age children. Overall, the epidemic spread from southeast to northwest. Prox-
imity to airports and being intersected by national highways or freeways but not railways were variables associated
with the presence of the disease in a county. Lower temperature and lower relative humidity were the climatic
factors facilitating local transmission after correction for the effects of school summer vacation and public holidays,
as well as population density and the density of medical facilities. Theseﬁndings indicate that interventions focused
on domestic travel, population density, and climatic factors could play a role in mitigating the public health impact of
future inﬂuenza pandemics.
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Abbreviations: CCDC, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention; CISDCP, China Information System for Disease
Control and Prevention.
In early April2009, human cases ofinfection with 2009
pandemic inﬂuenza A (H1N1) virus were ﬁrst identiﬁed
in the United States and Mexico (1). Thevirus then spread
rapidly to other regions of the world. As of January 24,
2010, laboratory-conﬁrmed cases of pandemic inﬂuenza
(H1N1-2009) werebeing reportedinmore than 209 countries
or regions worldwide, with 14,711 deaths among conﬁrmed
cases (2). Pandemic inﬂuenza was introduced to mainland
China on May 9, 2009 (3, 4), and then spread across the
whole country. By the end of 2009, more than 120,000
conﬁrmed cases were reported to the Chinese Center for
Disease Control and Prevention (CCDC), including 648
deaths (5). Information on reported cases was released
daily by the Ministry of Health of the People’s Republic
of China in the early stages of the pandemic and then
twice weekly later on.
Analyzing the information gathered and unearthing under-
lying risk factors provide an opportunity to identify epidemic
characteristics and transmission patterns of the pandemic in
China, thereby producing useful information for prevention
and control measures during future epidemics. In this study,
we aimed to characterize the temporal and spatial distribution
of pandemic inﬂuenza in mainland China, to understand the
diffusion pattern of the diseasewithin thecountry, and to iden-
tify risk factors for invasion and local transmission of this
disease.
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Data collection
We used a database that included all cases of pandemic
inﬂuenza(H1N1-2009)reportedtotheChinaInformationSys-
tem for Disease Control and Prevention (CISDCP) from May
9,2009,whentheﬁrstconﬁrmedcaseinChinawasreported,to
December 31, 2009 (6). The CISDCP covers all provincial,
prefectural,andcountycentersfordiseasecontrolandpreven-
tion,95.3%oftheprovincial,prefectural,andcountyhospitals
(9,084intotal),and84.0%oftownshipclinics(38,175intotal)
across mainland China. After the World Health Organization
issued an alert about the novel inﬂuenza virus (H1N1-2009),
pandemic inﬂuenza was classiﬁed as a class B notiﬁable in-
fectious disease on April 30, 2009, by the Ministry of Health
butwasmanagedaccordingtothecriteriaforclassAnotiﬁable
infectious diseases. According to the Law for Prevention and
Control of Infectious Diseases in China, information regarding
each patient, once identiﬁed, must be reported to the CCDC
within 2 hours through the Web-based CISDCP system. A sus-
pected case was deﬁned as a person with inﬂuenza-like symp-
toms who had had close contact with a conﬁrmed case within
thepast7days,hadahistoryoftraveltoaffectedareaswithinthe
past 7 days, or tested positive for inﬂuenza A virus, excluding
other known subtypes of inﬂuenza A. A laboratory-conﬁrmed
case was deﬁned according to World Health Organization
criteria—thatis,apersonwithinﬂuenza-likesymptomsand
laboratory-conﬁrmed pandemic inﬂuenza Avirus infection
by one or more of the following tests: reverse-transcriptase
polymerase chain reaction, real-time reverse-transcriptase
polymerase chain reaction, viral culture, or a 4-fold rise in spe-
ciﬁc antibodies to pandemic inﬂuenza A virus (7). Inﬂuenza-
like symptoms were deﬁned according to World Health
Organization criteria: sudden onset of fever greater than 38 C,
cough or sore throat, and absence of other diagnoses (8).
Figure 1. Epidemic curves for pandemic inﬂuenza (H1N1-2009) in
mainlandChina,2009.A)Dailytemporaldistributionofconﬁrmedcases;
B) daily temporal distribution of deaths due to pandemic inﬂuenza
(H1N1-2009).
Figure 2. Epidemic curves for pandemic inﬂuenza (H1N1-2009) for
5 selectedcities/provincesindifferent regionsofmainlandChina,2009.
A)GuangdongProvinceinsouthern China; B)ShanghaiCity ineastern
China; C) Shaanxi Province in central China; D) Tibet Autonomous
Region in western China; E) Beijing City in northern China.
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ourdatabase,includinginformationaboutage,sex,occupation,
residence address, work address, onset date and location, hos-
pitaladmissiondateandaddress,andclinicaloutcome.Further-
more, census information was obtained from the National
Bureau of Statistics of China (9).
Analyses of temporal and spatial distribution
Epidemiccurveswerecreatedbyplottingthedailynumberof
newly conﬁrmed cases and the number of deaths. Mainland
China is divided into 2,925 counties, which are political sub-
divisions of provinces, usually containing several townships.
Table 1. Association Between Duration of Time (Days) to the First Conﬁrmed Case of Pandemic Inﬂuenza A (H1N1-2009) and Travel-related
Factors at the County Level
a in Survival Analysis, People’s Republic of China, 2009
Variable and Unit
b Median Duration,
c
days (IQR)
Univariate Cox Analysis Multivariate Cox Analysis
Crude HR 95% CI P Value Adjusted HR 95% CI P Value
Intersected by
national highway
No 172 (130 to >237) 1.00 1.00
Yes 161 (126–195) 1.32 1.21, 1.44 <0.001 1.25 1.14, 1.37 <0.001
Intersected by railway
No 173 (133–212) 1.00
Yes 159 (124–198) 1.19 1.09, 1.29 <0.001 NS (excluded)
Intersected by freeway
No 171 (134–215) 1.00
Yes 140 (118–187) 1.45 1.33, 1.58 <0.001 1.21 1.10, 1.32 <0.001
Distance to the nearest
airport (categorical), km
<40 130 (96–171)
40–79 168 (128–205)
80–120 170 (133–204)
>120 177 (146 to >237)
Distance to the nearest
airport (continuous), 50 km
0.80 0.77, 0.83 <0.001 0.87 0.84, 0.91 <0.001
Population density
(categorical), per km
2
<120 180 (160 to >237)
120–299 172 (135–203)
300–700 159 (126–205)
>700 128 (91–168)
Population density
(continuous),
1,000 persons per km
2
1.08 1.08, 1.09 <0.001 1.08 1.07, 1.09 <0.001
Density of medical facilities
(categorical),
per 10,000 people
<0.6 159 (124–199)
0.6–0.9 165 (127–199)
1.0–1.4 164 (128–201)
>1.4 167 (130 to >237)
Density of medical facilities
(continuous),
per 10,000 people
0.93 0.91, 0.95 <0.001 0.98 0.95, 1.00 0.068
Abbreviations: CI, conﬁdence interval; HR, hazard ratio; IQR, interquartile range; NS, not signiﬁcant.
a Unaffected counties were considered as right-censored, and results were corrected for population density and the density of medical facilities.
b For all continuous variables, categorical results are also reported to allow inspection of the data and assessment of whether or not the
assumption regarding continuous variables was justiﬁed.
c Duration of time to the ﬁrst conﬁrmed case for all affected counties, starting on May 9, 2009, the date of the ﬁrst conﬁrmed case in the whole of
mainland China; right-censored at 237 days for all unaffected counties.
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using 2009 census data. As was done previously (10, 11), each
casewaslinkedtoadigitalmapofChina(1:100,000)according
to its onset location. The incidence for each county was calcu-
lated and standardized using direct standardization for age and
sex according to the overall composition of the 2009 Chinese
population, using 5-year age-group categories. To explore the
spatial and temporal diffusion trend of pandemic inﬂuenza in
mainland China, a map of pandemic inﬂuenza spread was de-
velopedusingtrend surfaceanalysis,which isaspatialsmooth-
ing method that uses polynomials with geographic coordinates,
asdeﬁnedbythecentralpointofeachcounty(12–14).Thetime
delay of the ﬁrst conﬁrmed case for each county was deﬁned as
the duration of time (in days) since May 9, 2009, the date of the
ﬁrstconﬁrmedcaseinmainlandChina.Atrendsurfaceonthese
durations was created in ArcGIS 9.2 (ESRI Inc., Redlands,
California) using a second-order trend surface model with
a local polynomial method to explore the diffusion patterns
of pandemic inﬂuenza over time. In addition, the epidemic
curves were also plotted for 5 selected cities/provinces in
different regions of mainland China: Guangdong (southern
China), Shanghai (eastern China), Shaanxi (central China),
Tibet (western China), and Beijing (northern China).
Statistical analysis of risk factors
To assess the association between the invasion of pandemic
inﬂuenzaanddifferentmeansofdomestictravel,weperformed
a survival analysis (Cox analysis) of the time delay of the ﬁrst
conﬁrmedcaseforeachaffectedcounty,consideringunaffected
countiesasright-censored.Thetimedelayoftheﬁrstconﬁrmed
casewasdeﬁnedastheduration(indays)sinceMay9,2009,the
date of the ﬁrst conﬁrmed case in mainland China. Domestic
travel was expressed using 4 variables: distance (from the mid-
point of each county) to the nearest civil airport andwhether or
notacountywasintersectedbynationalhighways,freeways,or
railways. This information was obtained from the National
BureauofStatisticsofChina(9,15).Spatialanalyseswereused
to extract data on these variables in ArcGIS 9.2 (ESRI Inc.).
Since population density is also linked to human activities and
mayfacilitateinﬂuenzatransmission(16,17)andsincedensity
of medical facilities could be linked to patient reporting, we
adjusted for the effects of these variables. In this study, the
population density for each county was obtained from the
National BureauofStatisticsofChina(9,15),andthedensities
of medical facilities were based on the CISDCP, including all
reporting sectors for notiﬁable infectious diseases, comprising
provincial, prefectural, and county centers for disease control
andpreventionandprovincial,prefectural,andcountyhospitals
and township clinics. Hazard ratios and their 95% conﬁ-
dence intervals and P values were estimated using maximum
likelihood methods. Hazard ratios for the continuous variables
were calculated for the following units: distance to the nearest
airport (in 50-km increments), population density (in 1,000
persons per km
2), and density of medical facilities (in number
ofreportingsectorsforpandemicinﬂuenzaper10,000persons).
Toexploretheeffectofclimaticfactorsonlocaltransmission
within counties, we performed multilevel Poisson regression.
Climaticdata(temperature,relativehumidity,andprecipitation)
during May–December 2009 were obtained from the National
Meteorological Bureau of China (18). Owing to probable time
lags, the climatic variables were processed by calculating the
averagevalueforthecurrentdayandalagof1–3days,whichis
the observed incubation period of pandemic inﬂuenza (19).
Poisson regression deals with the daily number of laboratory-
conﬁrmedcasespercounty.Theinclusionofthepopulationsize
foreachcountyasanoffsetmakesitananalysisofincidence.To
account for possible confounding, we included school summer
vacation and public holidays, the proportion of the school-age
population (ages 6–19 years), population density, and the den-
sity of medical facilities as correction factors in the analysis.
Thepercentagechangeinincidenceinresponsetothechangeof
the variable by a given amount (10 C for temperature, 10% for
relative humidity, 1 mm for precipitation, 10% for school-age
population, 1,000 persons per km
2 for population density,
andnumberoffacilitiesper10,000persons)wasusedtoreﬂect
theimpactofeachvariable.The95%conﬁdenceintervalsand
corresponding P values were estimated after correcting for
overdispersion because of the nature of infectious diseases
with spatial clustering patterns (20, 21). For temperature, we
also included a quadratic term in the analysis.
For all analyses, univariate analysis was performed ﬁrst to
examine the effect of each variable separately. Multivariate
analysis was then performed by including all variables with
P values less than 0.20 in univariate analysis and exclusion of
variables with P values greater than 0.10, using a standard
backward likelihood ratio method. For all continuous vari-
ables, we also presented categorical results in 3–5 categories
toallowinspectionofthedataanddeterminewhetherornot
the assumption regarding continuous variables (quadratic
for temperature) was justiﬁed. Statistical analyses were
performedusingtheStatapackage(StataCorpLP,College
Station,Texas)(20).Readersinterestedinfurtherresearch
cancontactthecorrespondingauthortoobtainthefulldata
set used in this study.
RESULTS
Atotalof121,805casesofpandemicinﬂuenza(H1N1-2009),
distributedinall31provincesinmainlandChina,werereported
from May 9, 2009, to December 31, 2009. There was much
variation in the numbers of conﬁrmed cases in different prov-
inces,rangingfrom881to12,748,withamedianof2,958cases,
and in the incidence of conﬁrmed cases in different provinces,
rangingfrom3.94per100,000populationto71.72per100,000,
with a median of 8.41 per 100,000. From the time proﬁle, we
found that the number of conﬁrmed cases increased rapidly
beginning at the end of August, when a new term began for
school students, and peaked by the end of November. The ﬁrst
deathcausedbypandemicinﬂuenzawasreportedonOctober4,
2009.Thenumberofdeathseventuallyroseto648bytheendof
theyear,andpeakedinearlyDecember(Figure1).Theage-and
sex-standardized incidence map shows that the epidemic
spanned a large geographic area, and the most affected areas
were in western China(see Web Figure 1, which appears on the
Journal’s website (http://aje.oxfordjournals.org/)). Signiﬁcant
differences in incidence were found among age groups, with
incidences peaking in school-age groups (Web Figure 1). Boys
showed a higher incidence than girls (ages <20 years).
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demicinﬂuenza overtimeinmainland China and indicates that
the epidemic areas during the ﬁrst 120 days after May 9, 2009,
were limited to the circumferences of cities with international
airports, such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen,
Chengdu, and Changchun. Thereafter, it spread to the rest
ofmainlandChina,roughlyfromsoutheasttonorthwest.The
largest-scale spread took place 150–180 days after the ﬁrst
case(WebFigure2).Figure2showsthelargevariationinthe
temporal patterns of pandemic inﬂuenza for the 5 selected
cities/provinces, but there wa sam a r k e dd r o pi ni n c i d e n c e
during the ﬁrst week of October for all locations.
Survivalanalysisofthedurationoftimetotheﬁrstconﬁrmed
caseineachcountyindicatedthatall4factorsrelatedtodomes-
tic travel or human mobility were signiﬁcantly associated with
the invasion of pandemic inﬂuenza in the Cox univariate anal-
ysis (Table 1). Population density and the density of medical
facilities also showed a signiﬁcant association. The signiﬁcant
effect of being intersected by railways disappeared, and the
densityofmedicalfacilitiesshowedborderlinesigniﬁcance
after correction for other factors in multivariate analysis,
whereas being intersected by national highways and free-
ways and proximity to airports and higher population den-
sity remained as signiﬁcant factors, all showing a positive
association (Table 1).
Table 2 shows that all climatic factors (except precipitation),
school summer vacation and public holidays, proportion of the
school-age population, population density, and the density of
medical facilities were signiﬁcantly associated with the extent
of local transmission in univariate multilevel Poisson regres-
sion.Schoolsummervacationandpublicholidaysshowedasig-
niﬁcant negative association with the incidence of pandemic
inﬂuenza. The signiﬁcant effect of the proportion of school-
agechildrendisappearedaftercorrectionforotherfactors;thus,
temperature, relative humidity, school summer vacation and
public holidays, population density, and the density of medical
facilitiesremainedassigniﬁcantfactorsinmultivariateanalysis.
Temperatureshowedapeakpattern,withthehighestincidences
for the range from 0 Ct o1 0  C, which was also reﬂected in the
statistically signiﬁcant quadratic term.
DISCUSSION
Our study provides a complete overview of the spatial
and temporal characteristics of the pandemic inﬂuenza
(H1N1-2009) epidemic in mainland China in 2009. The
Table 2. Association Between Incidence of Pandemic Inﬂuenza A (H1N1-2009) and Climatic Factors at the County Level in Multilevel Poisson
Regression,
a People’s Republic of China, 2009
Variable and Unit
b Daily Average
Incidence
No. of
Observations
Univariate Analysis Multivariate Analysis
Crude %
Change 95% CI P Value Adjusted %
Change 95% CI P Value
Temperature
(categorical),  C
<0 0.076 38,106
0–9 0.159 66,570
10–19 0.110 97,800
20–30 0.027 168,983
>30 0.009 16,467
Temperature
(continuous), 10 C
74.8 71.7, 77.9 <0.001 76.3 73.2, 79.5 <0.001
Quadratic temperature
(continuous), 100 C
 36.7  37.1,  36.3 <0.001  34.9  35.3,  34.5 <0.001
Relative humidity
(categorical), %
<20 0.316 1,770
20–39 0.164 20,645
40–59 0.096 67,031
60–80 0.065 199,565
>80 0.057 98,915
Relative humidity
(continuous), 10%
 4.4  4.8,  3.9 <0.001  1.4  1.9,  0.9 <0.001
Precipitation
(categorical), mm
0 0.088 208,047
0.01–1.00 0.063 167,906
>1.00 0.022 11,973
Precipitation
(continuous), 1 mm
1.0 1.0, 1.0 0.184 NS (excluded)
Table continues
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and temporal heterogeneity in different regions of mainland
China. Our analyses of the invasion of pandemic inﬂuenza in-
dicatedthatdomestictravelbyairandbynationalhighwaysand
freewaysandpopulationdensitycontributedtothespreadofthe
epidemic. Lower temperatures and lower relative humidity
were climatic factors that facilitated local transmission after
correction for the effects of school summer vacation and public
holidays, as well as population density and the density of med-
icalfacilities.Thedensityofmedicalfacilitiescouldhaveinﬂu-
enced pandemic inﬂuenza patient reporting, and this effect
seemed more important for the reporting of local transmission
(a highly signiﬁcant positive association) than for reporting of
the invasion (borderline signiﬁcance). This indicates that the
CISDCP can be further improved.
Intheinitialphaseoftheepidemic,theChinesegovernment
took measures to prevent and control the spread of the novel
inﬂuenzavirus,declaringitanotiﬁableinfectiousdiseasein
order to strengthen national surveillance and ﬁnd newly
conﬁrmed cases quickly. In addition, quarantine measures
were implemented at the international airports (e.g., Beijing,
Shanghai,Guangzhou,andFuzhou)toidentifyandisolateprob-
ablecasesandclosecontactsinordertodecreasetheriskoflocal
transmission caused by imported cases. It is possible that these
measureswere effective in achieving a slower pace ofspread in
the early stages of the epidemic, but the current evidence is
inconclusive (22). However, following the development of the
global pandemic and the beginning of the new school term,
a rapid spread of the epidemic occurred in mainland China,
and local outbreaks increased at the end of August 2009.
A reduction in incidence was observed during the ﬁrst week
of October, when there was an 8-day public holiday during the
National Days from October 1 to October 8. This drop in in-
cidencewas largely due to a lower tendency for patients to visit
medical facilities at that time, together with the fact that many
hospitals had reduced the open hours of their outpatient clinics
duringtheholidays.ThisisclearlyvisibleinFigure1,wherewe
seethedropbeginningonSeptember28,3days(i.e.,theaverage
duration between onset and seeing a physician) before the start
oftheholidayperiod.Thus,theholidayperiodledtoareduction
in the number of people being diagnosed with pandemic inﬂu-
enza. Apparently, most undiagnosed patients recovered in the
following days, because there was no marked compensation
visible in the days after the holiday period. Additionally, there
Table 2. Continued
Variable and Unit
b Daily Average
Incidence
No. of
Observations
Univariate Analysis Multivariate Analysis
Crude %
Change 95% CI P Value Adjusted %
Change 95% CI P Value
School summer vacation
and public holidays
No 0.113 187,797 1.0 1.0
Yes 0.039 200,129  62.3  62.8,  61.8 <0.001  36.4  37.2,  35.5 <0.001
Proportion of school-age
population
(categorical), %
<18 0.094 121,412
18–22 0.062 132,302
>22 0.070 134,212
Proportion of school-age
population
(continuous), 10%
 19.7  28.9,  9.4 <0.001 NS (excluded)
Population density
(categorical), per km
2
<120 0.083 92,787
120–299 0.039 95,396
300–700 0.043 96,416
>700 0.130 103,327
Population density
(continuous),
1,000 persons per km
2
13.1 10.2, 16.1 <0.001 14.8 11.8, 18.0 <0.001
Density of medical facilities
(categorical), per 10,000 people
<0.8 0.028 146,343
0.8–1.1 0.052 71,734
>1.1 0.125 169,849
Density of medical facilities
(continuous), per 10,000 people
62.5 52.3, 73.3 <0.001 43.5 35.3, 52.3 <0.001
Abbreviations: CI, conﬁdence interval; NS, not signiﬁcant.
a Results were adjusted for school summer vacation and public holidays, population density, and the density of medical facilities.
b For all continuous variables, categorical results are also reported to allow inspection of the data and assessment of whether or not the
assumption regarding continuous variables was justiﬁed.
2009 Pandemic Inﬂuenza A (H1N1) in China 895
Am J Epidemiol. 2012;175(9):890–897may have been some reduced transmission because of school
closure, as was observed in Japan, where transmission was
substantially reduced during school closure (23). In addition,
the temporal death curve could reﬂect the massive rise in
conﬁrmedcaseswithapproximately1week’sdelayfollowing
the peak of conﬁrmed cases at the end of November.
The direction of the spread of pandemic inﬂuenza was
from the southeast to the northwest, indicating how thevirus
beneﬁted from entering the country through international
airportsinthecoastalareasandspreadingfurtheralongroutes
of long-distance domestic travel.
With the fast-growing public transportation infrastructure
and increasing socioeconomic activities, travel has become an
important issue in the prevention of emerging airborne infec-
tious diseases such as inﬂuenza, especially during the introduc-
tion period. Obviously, the presence of airports and high
densitiesoftransportationroutescoincidewithmoredeveloped
areas (i.e., those with a higher population density and more
medicalfacilities);however,afterwecorrectedforthesefactors,
proximity to airports and the presence of national highways or
freeways remained signiﬁcantly associated with the spread of
the infection.
Geoinformaticsplaysanimportantroleinthestudyandcon-
trol of infectious disease outbreaks, and it includes techniques
such as geographic mapping and location-based alert services
(16, 24–26). As was recognized previously, the international
spread of pandemic inﬂuenza and severe acute respiratory syn-
drome was largely related to air travel (27–29). Our study con-
ﬁrms that air travel and transportation routes accelerated the
spread of pandemic inﬂuenza between counties in mainland
China. Air travel and travel by national highways and freeways
especially appeared to play a role, whereas railways were less
important. In mainland China, trains are mainly used for occa-
sional long-distance travel, whereas highways are more often
used for daily or weekly commuting, especially because bus
schedules are more ﬂexible. Our previous study on the geo-
graphic spread of the severe acute respiratory syndrome epi-
demic in China also demonstrated that domestic travel along
national highways played a more important role than travel by
railway (30). Data from the National Bureau of Statistics of
China show that passenger trafﬁc by highways in 2009 was
18.2 times that of railway travel (9). Transportation by high-
way remains an important mode of travel between Chinese
cities and provinces and therefore is a potential target for
controlling any future emerging airborne infections.
We also showed that lower temperature and lower relative
humiditycreateahigherriskoflocaltransmissionofpandemic
inﬂuenza.However,muchlowertemperature(e.g.,<0 C)did
not facilitate local transmission, as indicated by the daily in-
cidence over categorical temperature in Table 2, and required
inclusionofaquadraticvariableinthemodel.Theobservation
of an inﬂuence of temperature and relative humidity on pan-
demic inﬂuenza is in accordance with animal experiments
on seasonal inﬂuenza virus (31). In addition, recent studies
have suggested that absolute humidity could also play an
important role in the transmission of pandemic inﬂuenza
andseasonalvariationsininﬂuenza epidemics intemperate
regions (32–34). As expected, population density further facil-
itated both invasion and local transmission, whereas holiday
periodsreducedspread(16,17,35,36).Wealsousedpopulation
size as a correction factor instead of population density, which
led to similar results (not shown).
In conclusion, this is the ﬁrst complete documentation of
pandemic inﬂuenza in mainland China, to our knowledge.
The ﬁndings indicate that interventions focused on domestic
travel, population density, and climatic factors could play
a major role in mitigating the public health impact of future
inﬂuenza pandemics.
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